BIP 106: Dynamically Controlled Bitcoin Block Size Max Cap
In plain English: Proposed letting the maximum block size rise or fall at each difficulty adjustment based on how full recent blocks were, with a variant that also considered miners' fee income. The idea was to adapt capacity to demand automatically; it was part of the block size debate.
- Status
- Closed
- Type
- Specification
- Layer
- Consensus (hard fork)
- Authors
- Upal Chakraborty
- Assigned
- Last changed
- Topics
- Network
- Source
- bip-0106.mediawiki on GitHub · Markdown
Abstract
This BIP proposes replacing the fixed one megabyte maximum block size with a dynamically controlled maximum block size that may increase or decrease with difficulty change depending on various network factors. I have two proposals regarding this...
i. Depending only on previous block size calculation.
ii. Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx fee collected by miners.
Motivation
With increased adoption, transaction volume on bitcoin network is bound to grow. If the one megabyte max cap is not changed to a flexible one which changes itself with changing network demand, then adoption will hamper and bitcoin's growth may choke up. Following graph shows the change in average block size since inception...
Specification
Proposal 1 : Depending only on previous block size calculation
If more than 50% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is more than 90% MaxBlockSize Double MaxBlockSize Else if more than 90% of block's size, found in the first 2000 of the last difficulty period, is less than 50% MaxBlockSize Half MaxBlockSize Else Keep the same MaxBlockSize
Proposal 2 : Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx fee collected by miners
TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty = Sum of all Block size of first 2008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty = Sum of all Block size of second 2008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period (This actually includes 8 blocks from last but one difficulty)
TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty = Sum of all Tx fees of first 2008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty = Sum of all Tx fees of second 2008 blocks in last 2 difficulty period (This actually includes 8 blocks from last but one difficulty)
If ( ( (Sum of first 4016 block size in last 2 difficulty period)/4016 > 50% MaxBlockSize) AND (TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty > TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty) AND (TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty > TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty) ) MaxBlockSize = TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty * MaxBlockSize / TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty Else If ( ( (Sum of first 4016 block size in last 2 difficulty period)/4016 < 50% MaxBlockSize) AND (TotalTxFeeInLastDifficulty < TotalTxFeeInLastButOneDifficulty) AND (TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty < TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty) ) MaxBlockSize = TotalBlockSizeInLastDifficulty * MaxBlockSize / TotalBlockSizeInLastButOneDifficulty Else Keep the same MaxBlockSize
Rationale
These two proposals have been derived after discussion on BitcoinTalk and bitcoin-dev mailing list. The original idea and its evolution in the light of various arguments can be found here.
Proposal 1 : Depending only on previous block size calculation
This solution is derived directly from the indication of the problem. If transaction volume increases, then we will naturally see bigger blocks. On the contrary, if there are not enough transaction volume, but maximum block size is high, then only few blocks may sweep the mempool. Hence, if block size is itself taken into consideration, then maximum block size can most rationally be derived. Moreover, this solution not only increases, but also decreases the maximum block size, just like difficulty.
Proposal 2 : Depending on previous block size calculation and previous Tx fee collected by miners
This solution takes care of stable mining subsidy. It will not increase maximum block size, if Tx fee collection is not increasing and thereby creating a Tx fee pressure on the market. On the other hand, though the block size max cap is dynamically controlled, it is very difficult to game by any party because the increase or decrease of block size max cap will take place in the same ratio of average block size increase or decrease.
Compatibility
This is a hard-forking change to the Bitcoin protocol; anybody running code that fully validates blocks must upgrade before the activation time or they will risk rejecting a chain containing larger-than-one-megabyte blocks.
Other solutions considered
Making Decentralized Economic Policy - by Jeff Garzik
Elastic block cap with rollover penalties - by Meni Rosenfeld
Increase maximum block size - by Gavin Andresen
Block size following technological growth - by Pieter Wuille
The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments - by Joseph Poon & Thaddeus Dryja
Deployment
If consensus is achieved, deployment can be made at a future block number at which difficulty will change.